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Abstract  
This review presents a summary of evidence on outcomes from active labour market programs. Active 
labour market programs aim to increase the likelihood of employment for individuals who are 
unemployed or at risk of unemployment. The focus of this review is on studies of active labour market 
programs in Australia, supplemented with international evidence. An overview and historical 
background on active labour market programs is provided, as well as an introduction to the empirical 
methods used to estimate the effect of the programs. Evidence on the effects of the main types of 
programs – case management, work experience programs and formal education and training – is 
reviewed, and the main findings are distilled into a set of lessons for policy makers. The review 
concludes that active labour market programs cannot by themselves have a major impact on the rate of 
unemployment, but some spending on these programs is justified by outcomes such as increasing the 
pool of unemployed who are job ready and sharing the burden of unemployment. Job search and wage 
subsidy programs are suggested to be good ways to assist unemployed who are less disadvantaged. For 
unemployed with higher levels of disadvantage, priority should be given to programs that create jobs 
with opportunities for linked training, and that provide a pathway to a permanent job.  
 
Dealing with high levels of unemployment has now been a problem for policy-makers 
in Australia for over 40 years. Increases in unemployment that have occurred in 
Australia have been attributed primarily to downturns in the rate of growth in 
economic activity. Thus, the main response by governments has been to apply 
macroeconomic policy to increase the rate of economic growth – for example, using 
fiscal stimulus, or lower interest rates. The other type of policy that has been used 
extensively by governments to deal with high unemployment has been a set of 
interventions known as active labour market programs.  
Active labour market programs seek to increase the likelihood of employment for 
individuals who are unemployed or at risk of unemployment, by changing their search 
behaviour or raising their skills and job readiness. In Australia active labour market 
programs have remained consistently important since the mid-1970s; at present 
Australia spends about 0.3 percent of its GDP on active programs for the unemployed. 
Whether active labour market programs can improve outcomes for the unemployed, 
however, remains a much-debated topic. An illustration is the controversy surrounding 
the Commonwealth government’s attempt in 2014 to expand the requirement for 
recipients of unemployment payments to participate in the Work for the Dole program. 
These reforms drew considerable criticism from business and welfare lobby groups as 
well as service providers for the unemployed (for example, Allard and Hunt 2014). 
This controversy might indicate a lack of knowledge about the effect of active 
labour market programs. But that is not the case – there is today a large body of 
evidence, from Australian and international studies, available to inform policymaking 
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on active labour market programs. These studies, mostly undertaken over the past 25 
years with newly available administrative data sources and using rigorous statistical 
methods, provide a comprehensive and robust set of lessons about the performance of 
active labour market programs. 
Presenting a summary of these lessons is the main objective of this review. The 
lessons have been identified using studies of recent active labour market programs in 
Australia (see Appendix 1), supplemented with evidence from studies of international 
labour market programs, especially where those studies can provide important 
additional findings beyond the scope of the Australian research. 
The review is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the main types of active 
labour market programs, and section 3 presents arguments for how these programs 
might reduce unemployment. Section 4 describes the history of labour market 
programs in Australia. Section 5 summarises the main empirical methods for 
identifying the effects of active labour market programs. Section 6 describes briefly 
how the Australian literature on active labour market programs has developed in recent 
years, and the criteria for selecting studies for inclusion in this review. The core of the 
review is section 7, which summarises the main findings on the effects of active labour 
market programs. Section 8 presents lessons for policy makers. 
What are active labour market programs?  
Active labour market programs are a set of interventions directed at individuals who 
are currently unemployed or at risk of becoming unemployed that aim to increase their 
likelihood of employment. One type of active labour market program seeks to increase 
the amount and/or effectiveness of job search undertaken by the unemployed. A 
second type of program provides work experience and may also provide on-the-job 
training. A third type of program provides formal training and education.  
Job search programs seek to affect how the unemployed look for jobs. This can 
happen in two main ways. First, the programs can raise the intensity of job search, 
generally by imposing a requirement for a minimum number of job applications to be 
made in a specified time period, and monitoring to verify that the requirement is met. 
An example is the Jobseeker Diary (JSD) which was introduced in Australia in the 
mid-1990s. The JSD was a job search verification program requiring unemployment 
payment recipients to complete a fortnightly diary in which details of a specified 
minimum number of job applications were recorded. Second, the programs can 
improve the effectiveness of job search, for example by providing extra advice and 
assistance to the unemployed about how to search for a job. An example is the Job 
Club program from the 1990s, which provided job seekers with instruction on job 
search techniques and support from a Job Club leader. 
Work experience programs can involve support for the unemployed to obtain 
employment in the private sector; or placement in public sector jobs created for that 
purpose. The objective of providing work experience is to increase the human capital 
and job readiness of participants, and to potentially provide a credible signal of their 
job readiness to employers. 
The main means of support to obtain private sector employment has been via wage 
subsidy programs where employers are paid a subsidy for giving a job to an eligible 
unemployed job-seeker. An early example in Australia was the Special Youth 
Employment and Training Program (SYETP), introduced in 1976, which paid a fixed 
wage subsidy for four months to an employer who provided a job to a youth who had 
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been unemployed for at least four of the last eight months. In 1985 the scheme was 
superseded by the JOBSTART program, which provided a similar type of subsidy for 
long-term unemployed in all age groups. The other method of support for obtaining 
private sector employment has been to provide a subsidy for the unemployed to start 
their own businesses.  
Programs to directly create public sector jobs for the unemployed have mainly 
involved the Commonwealth government providing funding to community groups or 
service providers to undertake labour-intensive projects designed to provide facilities 
or services of community benefit. There have been many examples of direct job 
creation programs in Australia: the Regional Employment Development Scheme 
(REDS) in the 1970s; the Community Employment Program (CEP) in the 1980s; and 
New Work Opportunities (NWO) in the 1990s. The most recent manifestation is the 
WfD program, initially introduced in 1998, where eligible unemployment payment 
recipients were required to contribute to specified projects of benefit to the community 
such as environmental work, construction projects, maintenance of community 
facilities, and work in hospitals and the aged care sector (Commonwealth DEWRSB 
1999, 2, 33; OECD 2012, 204).  
Formal training and education programs seek to increase the skills and job 
readiness of the unemployed in a classroom environment. Examples of this type of 
program in Australia have been JOBTRAIN and the Youth Training Initiative (YTI). 
The latter program, introduced in the early 1990s, provided intensive case management 
to young people who had been receiving unemployment payments for three months. It 
aimed to assist them to return to school or undertake further education or vocational 
training. The New Enterprise Incentive Scheme (NEIS) currently provides jobseekers 
who are interested in starting a small business with accredited training (and ongoing 
income support) for one year. 
The obligation for unemployed people to participate in labour market programs in 
Australia derives from activity test requirements associated with receiving income 
support from the government. The Social Security Act 1991 (Section 601) requires that 
(unless exempted) unemployment payment recipients must meet an ‘activity test’ – to 
be actively looking for work, or undertaking activities to improve their employment 
prospects, and be willing to accept offers of suitable employment. Enforcement of the 
activity requirement is via penalties that involve some loss of income support 
payments where an unemployed person is judged to have been non-compliant.  
What are the arguments for labour market programs? 
The objective of active labour market programs is to increase the likelihood of 
employment for the unemployed. It might seem unnecessary to go further than this to 
explain why the policy can improve society’s well-being. Isn’t it a win-win if some 
unemployed shift to employment? They are made better off by having a job, and the 
rest of society gains from higher output and lower income support payments to the 
unemployed. However, working out whether society does gain is more complicated.  
An active labour market program may cause a person who would otherwise have 
remained unemployed to obtain a job. But where does this job come from? Suppose an 
unemployed person participated in a program to make them more effective in their job 
search. Because they are better at job search (maybe now with a more professional CV 
and improved interview technique) they get a job they would not otherwise have 
obtained. But there is still the same number of jobs in the economy as before. The fact 
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that this person got the job means that someone else missed out on that job. There has 
simply been a switch in who is unemployed.  
Or think about a direct job creation program. In this case it may seem that there is a 
benefit to society, because this is an extra job created by the government for a person 
who is unemployed. But again, there is a problem with this argument. The government 
must fund its public sector job creation using tax revenue. Higher taxes will mean 
lower spending by consumers. That lower spending will mean less demand for private 
sector output and hence lower employment. Thus by funding an extra public sector 
job, the government may remove a job elsewhere in the economy.  
Therefore, consideration of the role of active labour market programs must begin 
with the understanding that the programs do not directly increase the total number of 
jobs available (where the number of available jobs is equal to the jobs that are filled 
plus vacancies). It is necessary to find other rationales for how they can improve 
society’s well-being.  
One way in which this can happen is by keeping as many unemployed as possible 
‘job ready’ – that is, with skills and motivation such that an employer with an available 
job vacancy would be willing to appoint and retain them. This can be done, for 
example, using programs that encourage job search, increase job seekers’ skills, or 
ensure compliance with activity test requirements (for example, Besley and Coate 
1992). Once extra jobs become available it will then be possible to fill those new 
vacancies more quickly than otherwise, with a positive effect on national output. 
Quicker matching of unemployed to jobs will also assist macro-economic 
policymaking by improving the inflation/unemployment trade-off; and having a larger 
proportion of unemployed who are ‘job-ready’ can improve wellbeing by sharing the 
burden of unemployment more evenly throughout society.  
A brief history of labour market programs in Australia 
Substantial spending on active labour market programs in Australia commenced with 
the onset of high unemployment in the early 1970s. Since that time there has always 
been some spending on these programs, with the level of expenditure varying from 
year to year in line with changes in the rate of unemployment (Figure 1). Spending on 
active labour market programs has always been primarily a Commonwealth 
government responsibility – for example, in the early 1990s it was estimated that 
Commonwealth spending accounted for 97 percent of total expenditure on labour 
market programs (EPAC 1996, 89). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, labour market programs in Australia were controlled by a 
public employment agency, the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES). 
Recipients of unemployment income support payments were assessed by the CES, and 
either matched to jobs using a national vacancy dataset or referred to labour market 
programs. Places in programs were limited, so there was no guarantee of participation 
for an unemployed person. 
The Working Nation strategy, introduced in 1994, sought to integrate and extend 
existing labour market programs to provide a systematic approach to reducing long-
term unemployment. Notable innovations were a greater degree of compulsion for 
unemployment payment recipients to participate in available programs (following the 
introduction of activity agreements for unemployment payment recipients in 1991), 
and partial privatisation of the counselling and referral roles of the CES (Davidson and 
Whiteford 2012, 53; Davidson 2011, 59).  The centrepiece of Working Nation was the  
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Figure 1 Spending on active labour market programs in Australia, 1985-2012 
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Job Compact, the offer of a job to all unemployment payment recipients who had been 
receiving benefits for 18 months or more (Commonwealth DEETYA 1996a, 40-41). 
A major change in the provision of active labour market programs occurred in the 
late 1990s with the introduction of the Job Network, a ‘managed’ market for private 
sector provision of government-funded services to the unemployed (Davidson 2011, 
62-64; Davidson and Whiteford 2012, 54-66). The Job Network encompassed two 
main types of service providers: a public sector agency (Centrelink), and Job Network 
providers. Centrelink became the initial contact point for an unemployed person, 
providing a single ‘shopfront’ point of access to employment and income support 
services. Centrelink assessed eligible unemployed persons and where relevant referred 
them to Job Network providers (Commonwealth DEETYA 1996b, 27). Job Network 
service providers were to supply services to referred unemployed job-seekers 
according to their assessed needs as determined by their Job Seeker Classification 
Index (JSCI) score.  
The Job Network model remained the basis for labour market programs through the 
greater part of the 2000s. During this time it underwent a variety of reforms. In 2004 
the Active Participation Model was introduced. This specified a path of service 
provision for any unemployed person, making their program participation dependent 
on the duration of their unemployment spell rather than just their JSCI score. On 
referral from Centrelink an unemployed person would have three months of job search 
support, followed by three months of job search training, six months undertaking a 
Mutual Obligation Initiative (MOI) activity. If they were still unemployed after 12 
months they would move into the phase of Intensive Assistance. At the same time 
payments to service providers were restructured and a Job Seeker account was created 
for each unemployed person to fund services and programs that would reduce their 
barriers to employment. This was done with the objective of giving service providers 
an incentive to improve employment outcomes for all unemployed and not just those 
who were easy to place into jobs.  
In introducing the Job Network, the Coalition government also made major reforms 
to activity test arrangements for unemployment income support recipients. These 
reforms sought to tighten activity test requirements. First, an obligation to complete a 
diary (JSD) every fortnight for three months was imposed on all new recipients from 
July 1996, and penalties for breaching job search conditions were restructured. Second, 
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the Mutual Obligation Initiative was introduced in July 1998. The MOI involved a 
requirement to undertake an approved activity as well as continuing to look for work. 
These activities included work experience activities, training and education, and 
intensive job search. Participation in MOI was initially required for those aged 18–24 
years who had been in receipt of payments for 6 months and whose activity type was 
job search. Subsequently the program was extended to recipients aged up to 50 years.  
In 2009-10 Job Services Australia took over responsibility for labour market 
programs. Job Services Australia integrated previously separate services. It also 
introduced new categories to characterise job seekers’ extent of disadvantage and the 
timing and type of services they would receive from their chosen provider. The JSCI 
score once more played a significant role in determining the type of assistance an 
unemployed person received, and there was greater flexibility in program participation. 
Disability Employment Services, a new vehicle for assisting persons with a disability, 
was also established (OECD 2012, 72-73; Taskforce on Strengthening Government 
Service Delivery for Job Seekers 2011, Appendix C). 
The compliance and penalty regime associated with labour market program 
participation has undergone several reforms since the 1990s (Davidson and Whiteford 
2012, 46-52). Before 1997 the penalty for non-compliance with activity test conditions 
was complete withdrawal of income support for periods of time that increased with 
each successive breach. In response to concerns about the financial hardship caused by 
total withdrawal of support, a new policy of partial loss of payment for the first and 
second instances of non-compliance was introduced in 1997. However, due to an 
increase in monitoring and enforcement, more penalties were actually incurred at this 
time. In 2006, partial penalties were replaced by temporary suspension of payments in 
order to improve compliance. In 2009-10 temporary suspension of payments was 
extended, with a set of penalties tailored to the severity of the breach of activity test 
requirement. These were integrated with a system of ‘comprehensive compliance 
assessments’, which sought to address persistent non-compliance. 
How do we measure the effect of active labour market programs? 
Most Australian and international studies of active labour market programs focus on 
estimating the impact of the program. The impact is a measure of how outcomes for 
the unemployed are changed by participating in a labour market program; that is, the 
difference between what happens to an unemployed person when they participate in 
the program compared to what would have happened had they not participated in the 
program. Outcomes studied include the incidence and duration of employment and 
earnings from labour market activity following program participation or, where 
administrative data on welfare payment receipt is being used, the incidence of 
payments and time spent on payments. A handful of studies have also undertaken 
benefit-cost analyses of labour market programs (for example, Borland and Tseng, 
2007, and Johnston, 2007). A benefit-cost analysis provides a monetary valuation of 
the net gain to society from a program. This measure of net gain compares the 
monetary benefits to society (for example, from the impact of the program on 
employment outcomes or welfare payment receipt) with the opportunity cost of 
resources used by the program. 
To estimate the impact of a program it is necessary to deal with what is known as 
the ‘evaluation problem’. Essentially this is the difficulty of choosing a control group 
whose outcomes can be compared with those of the program participants. It is critical 
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that the members of the control group have the same characteristics as the program 
participants. Otherwise, any difference in outcomes between the participants and the 
control group will confound the effects of program participation with differences in the 
characteristics of the participants and control group.  
Suppose, for example, we are interested in estimating the impact of a program, 
JobNow, on the likelihood that an unemployed person finds a job. JobNow requires 
participants to have been unemployed for at least 12 months. However, for our impact 
study we are only able to use a control group of unemployed who have spells of less 
than 12 months. The probability of finding a job decreases with time spent 
unemployed, thus it follows that the estimated impact of the JobNow program will 
partly reflect differences in the duration of unemployment spells between the program 
participants and the control group. More specifically, the estimated impact of the 
program will be biased downward compared to the true impact. This is because having 
shorter unemployment duration will, independent of any effect of the JobNow 
program, cause the control group to be more likely to move into a job than program 
participants.  
All studies included in this review use either an experimental or quasi-experimental 
approach to choosing a control group. In an experimental approach, individuals in a 
defined population are randomly assigned for participation or non-participation in a 
program, and the outcome of interest is compared between those groups. Random 
assignment should generate groups of participants and non-participants where each 
group has the same characteristics on average. Comparison of outcomes for the two 
groups will therefore provide an estimate of the causal impact of program 
participation. In a quasi-experimental approach, outcomes are compared for groups of 
program participants and non-participants who have not been deliberately randomly 
assigned. Quasi-experimental methods seek to solve the ‘evaluation problem’ by using 
as a control group program non-participants who have similar characteristics to the 
program participants, or comparing participants at two different periods (before and 
after participation). The validity of impact estimates from the quasi-experimental 
method depends on the extent to which outcomes for the control group accurately 
measure what would have occurred for program participants if they had not 
participated in the program. 
Experimental and quasi-experimental approaches are very different to the approach 
of monitoring outcomes that was used prior to the early 2000s by government 
departments in Australia with responsibility for labour market programs. Monitoring 
involves reporting outcomes for program participants; for example, the proportion of 
program participants in employment three months after completing the program. The 
problem with this approach is that it is exclusively about outcomes for program 
participants. By contrast, an impact measure compares employment outcomes of 
participants against outcomes for an equivalent group who did not participate in the 
program. Heckman et al. (2002) show that outcomes for labour market program 
participants are in general only weakly related to program impacts. 
Studies of active labour market programs in Australia 
In Australia the main source of data for evaluation of labour market programs has been 
government administrative data. These record program participation as part of the 
activity test requirement for receipt of an unemployment income support payment. 
Since this data source is controlled by a Commonwealth government department, 
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research on active labour market programs in Australia has almost exclusively been 
done by government departments or commissioned by them.  
Chapman and Stretton (1990) and Webster (1997) have already provided valuable 
surveys of the Australian evidence on the impact of labour market programs up to the 
mid-1990s. This review will focus on evaluations of labour market programs published 
since that time, building on the survey of recent studies in Davidson (2011).  
In the mid-1990s a series of evaluations of the Working Nation strategy was 
undertaken by the Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs. 
Subsequently there were evaluations of those programs by academic researchers using 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey of Employment and Unemployment Patterns 
longitudinal data. The next major development occurred in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, when the Department of Family and Community Services supplied 
administrative data on income support payment receipt to academic researchers, and 
sponsored them to undertake evaluations of programs such as MOI and JSD, as well as 
funding a series of randomised controlled trials (RCTs). This research is distinguished 
by the consistent application of quasi-experimental and experimental techniques to 
estimate program impacts. During the 2000s the Commonwealth government used a 
series of in-house evaluations to measure the impact of labour market programs such 
as Intensive Assistance and Work for the Dole. Unfortunately, limited information 
about the research methods used has made it difficult to evaluate the validity of these 
studies. Since the mid-2000s little independent evaluation has taken place of the 
impact of labour market programs, a point that has been especially noted by the OECD 
(2012, 32). 
My search strategy sought to identify all research on active labour market programs 
in Australia from studies of Working Nation onwards. I started with the many studies I 
was already aware of from my own previous research in this field. To find extra 
studies I mainly searched academic journals and the websites of government 
departments. I used a ‘snow-ball’ approach of examining the reference lists of studies 
included in the review in order to find other studies (especially Davidson 2011). 
Evaluations of Australian active labour market programs that are the core of this 
review use individual-level data, and have used experimental or quasi-experimental 
approaches to estimate program impact. This encompasses three main types of studies: 
 Randomised controlled trials;  
 Quasi-experimental evaluations where there is high degree of confidence in the 
validity of the control group due to assignment involving a natural experiment or 
selection on observables;  
 Quasi-experimental evaluation where there is lower confidence in the validity of 
the control group due to it being impossible to rule out selection effects in the 
estimate of the program impact.  
An example of the latter type of study would be where the method of assignment 
into a program has caused differences between the characteristics of treatment and 
control group members, but data limitations meant that it was only possible to control 
for a subset of those different characteristics. Estimates of the program impact are 
therefore likely to confound the true impact of a program and the effect of differences 
between treatment and control groups. 
The level of weight given to evidence from individual studies covered in this review 
accordingly varies depending on type of study. I put most weight on studies that use a 
randomised control method or a quasi-experimental estimator where there is a high 
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degree of confidence in the control group. I put less weight on studies where there is a 
lower degree of confidence in the validity of the control group, and the estimate of the 
program impact may be biased by a selection effect. In presenting my findings I 
identify where I have put less weight on a study, and give an explanation for why I 
believe the estimate of the program impact from that study may partly reflect a 
selection effect. 
Where useful, the findings from the core Australian studies will be integrated with 
conclusions drawn in the earlier Australian surveys. Findings from some international 
studies will also be used to supplement the review. Major surveys of those 
international studies are Martin (1998), Heckman et al. (1999), Kluve and Schmidt 
(2002), OECD (2005), Bergemann and van den Berg (2006), and Card et al. (2010). 
The effects of case management  
Case managers for the unemployed generally undertake two main roles: counselling; 
and monitoring to verify whether job search requirements are being met. Counselling 
can consist of providing advice on and assistance with job search, and advising or 
directing clients to participate in a labour market program. Job search verification 
involves monitoring job search efforts to ascertain whether minimum standards 
imposed by the government or the case manager (for example, number of job 
applications made per fortnight) are being met, and where they are not being met to 
apply sanctions. 
Counselling 
Australian studies of counselling demonstrate its impact depends on the scale of 
counselling provided; this service on a limited scale is unlikely to improve labour 
market outcomes for the unemployed.  
Breunig et al. (2003) studied the effect of an intervention that required the very 
long-term unemployed to attend two interviews with a case manager. Hours worked 
per week were reduced by participation in the interviews, although this was partly 
compensated for by more time spent in training. There was some evidence of greater 
social participation. The authors explained the limited impact of the intervention as the 
result of its ‘modest’ scale and the ‘extremely disadvantaged’ background of the 
participants (2003, 97-98). Borland et al. (2013) studied the effect of case management 
intended to provide integrated service delivery for 18–35 year old homeless 
unemployment payment recipients. They found no effects on the economic or 
psychological well-being of participants by 24 months after program commencement. 
Their explanation for the lack of impact again related to the modest scale of the 
program, as well as its highly disadvantaged participants (2013, 485).  
The other studies of a counselling-type intervention are the analyses of Job Clubs 
by Stromback and Dockery (2000); and of Job Search Training by the Commonwealth 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2006). Participation in these 
programs provided a higher level of assistance, and they are found to have had larger 
effects on employment outcomes. For example, participation in Job Clubs was 
estimated to have an up to 8 percent positive net impact on the probability of 
employment, similar to the range of 6–10 percent suggested by Webster (1997, 198) as 
indicative of the findings from earlier studies on the effect of Job Clubs. However, the 
control groups for these studies of Job Clubs and Job Search Training were constructed 
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using a limited approach to matching, and for that reason the estimated impacts are 
less reliable. 
It is in program implementation that case management has been found to make a 
difference in Australia. Studies of the MOI by Richardson (2003), Lim (2008), and 
Borland and Tseng (2010) found that what was supposed to be a universal program in 
fact had quite a limited take-up following its introduction. For example, Borland and 
Tseng (2010, 29) found that ‘only 15–35 percent of the eligible population were found 
to participate in the MOI program in its initial phase of operation’. Richardson (2003, 
90) attributed this to a failure of case managers to implement the program, concluding 
that the take-up reflected that ‘MOI requirements were not strictly enforced.’ Lim 
(2008) found the same outcome when MOI was extended to jobseekers aged 35–49 
years in July 2002. 
Ways to get job-seekers to engage with counselling have also been researched. 
Barrett and Cobb-Clark (2000–01) examined how the form of communication about 
opportunities for counselling affected participation. Specified groups of Parenting 
Payment recipients were randomised to either receive a letter inviting them or 
compelling them to attend an interview with a case manager. Seventeen percent of the 
invited group attended the interview, as opposed to 81 percent of the compelled group.  
International studies provide a range of extra information about the consequences of 
counselling. A major issue, of particular relevance over the past 10–20 years when 
many countries have contracted out provision of some or all of their labour market 
programs, is the relative impact of public and private counselling services. Several 
studies have examined this question for France and Germany (Behaghel et al. 2014; 
Krug and Stephan 2012; Bernhard and Wolff 2013). None of the studies found that 
private sector provision achieves better outcomes than public sector provision. The 
most rigorous study, by Behagel et al. (2014), found that the effect on exits to 
employment was twice as large for the public than for the private counselling service. 
By contrast, a UK study of employment zones, where private suppliers were contracted 
to provide work-first services to long-term unemployed, obtained the opposite result: 
better employment outcomes being achieved by private programs than from 
comparable public programs (Griffiths and Durkin 2007). What might explain the 
difference in findings? One hypothesis is that the quality of contracting with private 
suppliers, and hence the effectiveness of private supply, increases as the government 
has more experience dealing with a private market for supply of counselling services. 
Australian experience with the Job Network has been claimed to provide supporting 
evidence for this hypothesis. Finn (2011, 30), for example, argues that ‘Most of the 
studies were undertaken in the early phases of the development and implementation of 
sub-contracting reforms and they highlight faults in the design of contract incentives 
and procurement processes ... [whereas] the findings from Australian research suggest 
efficiency gains and cost reductions take some time to emerge.’ 
Another issue examined in international studies of job counselling is the effect of 
case manager expertise. In some situations a major role for case managers is to assign 
the unemployed to labour market programs. Lechner and Smith (2007) examined the 
performance of case managers in Switzerland undertaking this role, compared to 
alternative methods of assigning unemployed to programs. Assignment of unemployed 
persons to labour market programs by case managers is found to have only about same 
aggregate effect on labour market outcomes as random assignment. Substantially better 
labour market outcomes are achieved using a statistical rule for assignment based on 
the predicted impact of program participation. The style of case management can also 
affect outcomes from counselling. A study by Behncke et al. (2010) of employment 
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outcomes from counselling for unemployed in Switzerland found that having a less 
cooperative caseworker – who put relatively more weight on control and sanctions 
than on counselling meetings – meant a slightly higher probability of being in 
employment up to 36 months after registering as unemployed. 
Job search verification 
The main study of a job search verification program is the analysis of the JSD during 
its initial period of implementation in the mid to late 1990s (Borland and Tseng 2007). 
Being required to complete a minimum number of job contacts each fortnight was 
found to reduce the time spent on unemployment payments by about a fortnight in the 
first year after commencing JSD. The effect on the rate of exit from payments was 
concentrated during the time when participants were completing the diary.  
These findings on the JSD in Australia are highly consistent with evidence on job 
search verification programs in the US and Europe (for the US see Ashenfelter et al. 
2005, Klepinger et al. 2002, and Meyer 1995; for the United Kingdom see Manning 
2009 and Petrongolo 2010; and for the Netherlands see Gorter and Kalb 1996 and Van 
den Berg and van der Klaauw 2001). These international studies also found that the 
impact of job search verification is larger where the intervention has higher intensity; 
for example, where the amount of job search required is higher; and where intervention 
occurs at an earlier stage of an unemployment spell. Job search programs also appear 
to be most effective where they do not distort the ‘type’ of job search activities able to 
be undertaken; for example, between formal and informal search methods.  
Job search verification programs may be able to shift the unemployed off welfare 
payments, but there is less – and mixed – evidence on whether they shift the 
unemployed into jobs. One of the early studies for the Netherlands did find that 
program participants had a higher rate of transition into jobs (Gorter and Kalb 1996). 
More recently, studies of the UK Jobseekers Allowance found that this episode of 
tightening job search requirements was primarily associated with unemployment 
payment recipients moving to non-employment, and often to receiving other payment 
types such as incapacity benefits (Manning 2009; Petrongolo 2009). It is important to 
note, however, that the Jobseekers Allowance did not affect the intensity of job search. 
So it is possible that other job search verification programs, which have been found to 
increase the amount of job search, may have had more positive effects on the 
probability of employment. 
Even where a job search verification program has a positive impact on the 
likelihood of employment for participants, this does not necessarily mean that there is 
a net gain to society (Cahuc and Le Barbanchon 2010). A recent RCT of a case 
management program in France found that a higher rate of employment for program 
participants was entirely offset by a lower rate of employment for non-participants – 
what is known as a ‘displacement effect’ (Crepon et al. 2013). This implies that the 
potential benefits to society from a job search verification program would be from 
other sources such as redistribution – changing the identity of the unemployed to 
achieve a more equal distribution in the population of time spent in unemployment. 
The effects of work experience programs 
Private sector job creation 
The small amount of Australian evidence indicates that private sector job creation – 
via wage subsidy schemes – can have a positive effect on labour market outcomes for 
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participants. The main evidence comes from studies of the Working Nation policy, and 
the earlier SYETP. Johnston (2007) used a quasi-experimental matching method to 
examine the effect of the Working Nation interventions between 1994 and 1997, and 
concluded that at two years after program commencement ‘wage subsidy programs 
have a large positive impact on job seekers’ labour market outcomes.’ Stromback and 
Dockery (2000) also examined the Working Nation wage subsidy scheme and found 
even larger effects. These results, however, are certain to overestimate the true effect 
of the program. It is known that during Working Nation employers were only willing 
to take workers under the wage subsidy scheme if they had higher levels of skills 
(DEETYA 1996, 42); and in the case of Stromback and Dockery’s study the results 
will also reflect the limited set of observable characteristics used to construct the 
control group. Richardson (1998) examined the impact of the SYETP wage subsidy 
program for youth between 1984 and 1987. His study found that the program had a 
large positive effect on employment outcomes. Most of this effect was due to 
subsidised workers retaining the same job after the subsidy expiry, but the program 
also had a positive effect on later employment for those who lost their subsidised job. 
These findings are consistent with evidence from earlier Australian studies, which 
Webster (1997, 196) summarises: ‘Both the early Australian evaluations in the mid-
1980s and the more recent series in the 1990s have found that wage subsidy schemes 
do raise the employability of participants.’ 
A shortcoming of wage subsidy schemes is that employers appear to only be willing 
to take on unemployed persons they regard as relatively ‘job-ready’. A case in point 
was the Job Compact in the 1990s. The JobStart wage subsidy program was intended 
as the major method for fulfilling the job guarantee to unemployed persons whose 
spell duration had reached 18 months. However, while 70 percent of jobs were 
intended to come from wage subsidies, such placements only accounted for 34 percent 
of jobs in the initial phase of the Job Compact. The explanation provided by an official 
study was that ‘employers perceive that the long-term unemployed have a range of 
problems that can make them unsuitable employees’ (DEETYA 1997, 46–47). 
International evidence on wage subsidy programs is consistent with the findings 
from Australia. Kluve’s (2010, 904) review of European labour market programs, for 
example, concludes that ‘wage subsidies ... can be effective in increasing participants’ 
employment probability’; and the earlier review by the OECD (2005, 183) found 
‘hiring subsidies frequently find a positive impact of participation on employment 
even when ‘employment’ is defined to arise only after a transition to unsubsidised 
employment’. The UK Future Jobs Fund is a wage subsidy program recently found to 
have positive effects on outcomes for the unemployed (UK DWP 2012). Some 
international studies suggest that maximising the impact of wage subsidy schemes 
requires careful targeting of the subsidy, and choosing a length of subsidy that is just 
sufficient for an unemployed person to be able to reveal their value as an employee. 
Public sector job creation 
Evaluations of public sector job creation schemes in Australia generally find them to 
have had zero or negative impacts. The main studies have been of New Work 
Opportunities (NWO) in the mid-1990s and Work for the Dole in the late 1990s. 
Webster’s (1997, 198) review of previous evidence similarly found public sector job 
creation programs to be ‘marginally positive or negligible’ in their impact. 
Borland and Tseng (2011) studied the pilot phase of the WfD program in the late 
1990s. They concluded that participation in the program caused a large and significant 
negative effect on the likelihood of exiting unemployment payments. Richardson 
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(2003) examined the effects of WfD participation as part of a more general evaluation 
of the Mutual Obligation (MOI) program. She found that participants in WfD were 
much slower to move off payments than participants in other programs such as part-
time or voluntary work, or education. One limitation of this study is that payment 
recipients required to participate in MOI and those who choose an activity such as 
part-time work are likely to differ from participants in WfD, even after controlling for 
observable differences in their characteristics. 
In contrast, several studies by government departments have found that the WfD 
program reduced the likelihood of being in receipt of income support payments and 
increased the probability of employment. For example, a study by the Commonwealth 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2010a) found that 
participation in WfD lowered the likelihood of receiving income support payments at 
12 months after program commencement (see also Commonwealth DEWRSB 2000; 
Commonwealth DEWR 2006).  
The main difficulty with these studies is that the methodologies they use are 
unlikely to provide valid estimates of the impact of WfD. Significant criticisms of the 
methodology applied in the 2000 DEWRSB study were raised by the Productivity 
Commission (2002, Appendix E) and the OECD (2001, 220). For example, a group of 
program participants, some of whom had already left unemployment income support 
payments, were matched with a control group of non-participants, all of whom were 
receiving unemployment income support in August 1999. This created a bias towards 
finding a positive effect of WfD participation. The more recent studies apply a 
regression-based approach to estimate the program impact, with limited sets of 
covariates to control for differences between program participants and the control 
group. Both these aspects of methodology are known to be possible sources of bias in 
estimating program impacts. In addition, the lack of detailed information provided on 
the characteristics of the participant and control groups in the published reports makes 
it impossible to judge the extent of this bias. 
The other main analyses of public sector job creation are of the NWO program 
during Working Nation. Johnston (2007) used a matching approach to examine the 
impact of this program between 1994 and 1997. He found that employment outcomes 
for participants in NWO were not significantly different from non-participants. 
Stromback and Dockery (2000) did find positive effects of the NWO program, but 
again their results are likely to be less robust due to limitations in their methodology. 
International studies of public sector job creation programs almost uniformly have 
found them to be ineffective. From a review of 97 studies of labour market programs 
Card et al. (2010, F453) found that ‘subsidised public employment programs are 
relatively ineffective ... [and] the least successful programs are public sector jobs 
programs’. Commenting on direct job creation by the public sector, former OECD 
Head of Labour and Social Affairs John Martin (1998, 292) wrote: ‘The evaluation 
literature shows fairly conclusively that this measure has been of little success in 
helping unemployed people get permanent jobs in the open labour market’ (see also 
Heckman et al. 1999; OECD 2005; Kluve 2010). 
What explains the poor outcomes from public sector job creation programs? A 
review of work experience programs in Australia by the OECD highlighted the lack of 
skill development and the absence of a pathway to a permanent job as being major 
weaknesses of the WfD program (OECD 2012, 206). By contrast, successful public 
sector job creation programs appear to have mainly been ‘bottom up’ schemes, small-
scale initiatives targeted to meet local needs of job seekers and employers. These 
programs work by giving participants extra skills that are relevant to local jobs, and 
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providing a pathway to a permanent job. For example, Carling et al. (2001, 92) 
concluded from a review of Swedish programs that ‘subsidised employment 
programmes work better the closer they are to a regular employment relation’; and 
Sianesi’s (2008, 370) main finding from a review of Swedish labour market programs 
in the 1990s was that ‘the more similar to a regular job, the more effective a program is 
for its participants’. 
The effects of formal education and training 
There is little recent evidence on the impact of training programs in Australia, the only 
studies being of programs from the Working Nation strategy and Structured Training 
and Employment Projects (STEP) for Indigenous jobseekers. These studies reach 
mixed conclusions. 
Johnston’s (2007) analysis of the training stream of the Working Nation program 
found that employment outcomes were made worse for participants in those programs 
compared to non-participants; and Stromback and Dockery (2000) concluded that 
training was the least effective type of program in that period. By contrast, an 
evaluation of STEP in the 2000s found that the exit rate for program participants 
increased compared to a matched control group (Commonwealth DEEWR 2010b). 
Earlier studies of training programs in Australia also suggested a more positive story. 
Webster (1997, 197) described these studies as showing the effect of training programs 
to be ‘positive and sustained over the 6-month and 12-month period.’  
There are several major reviews of international evaluations of training programs – 
and they provide summaries that are highly consistent. The main message is neatly 
encapsulated by Greenberg et al.’s (2003, 31) meta-analysis of 31 US evaluations: ‘On 
average, the earnings effects of the evaluated programs seem to have been largest for 
women, quite modest for men, and negligible for youth’. These findings also hold for 
European training programs in more recent reviews (for example, Card and Kluve 
2010, F453; Kluve 2010, 914); as well as earlier reviews (Bergemann and van den 
Berg 2006; Lalonde 1995; Heckman et al. 1999). An exception to the generally 
negative findings on the effect of training programs for youth is the US Job Corps 
program, which has been found to increase educational attainment, reduce criminal 
activity, and raise earnings in the short term (Schochet 2008).  
One important finding from international studies of training programs is that their 
impact may change with time elapsed since program participation. A comparison of 
‘work-first’ and education and training programs in California’s GAIN programs found 
that their relative impact was reversed over time. Whereas work-first programs were 
associated with better employment outcomes after 1–3 years, after 7–9 years, it was 
education and training programs that brought the greatest employment gains (Hotz et 
al. 2006). Evidence of an increasing effect of training programs over time has also 
been found in West Germany (Wunsch and Lechner 2008), and in meta-analyses of US 
and European training programs (Greenberg et al. 2004; Card and Kluve 2010).  
Some reviews of international studies have sought to explain the mixture of 
outcomes for different specific training programs. It appears that programs with the 
largest positive impacts have been targeted at providing unemployed participants with 
skills that are needed for available jobs in their local labour market, and where a 
formal qualification is obtained (Martin 1998, 289). There is also some evidence for 
West Germany that training programs are more effective when the rate of 
unemployment is higher (Lechner and Wunsch 2009). 
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Other general lessons 
You get what you pay for  
A major lesson is that minimal interventions are unlikely to bring about substantial 
improvements in outcomes for the unemployed. Estimates of the effect of education on 
earnings in Australia suggest that an extra year of schooling will increase the earnings 
of an average worker by 5 to 8 percent (Leigh 2008). Most labour market programs are 
directed at a population with extreme skill disadvantages, and involve a minimal scale 
of intervention providing just a fraction of the skills or training obtained in a year of 
schooling. Hence, it should not be surprising that these programs are found to have 
limited effects.  
That minimal interventions are likely to have minimal effects is also a point that has 
been made in reviews of international studies by Heckman et al. (1999), and Lalonde 
(1995, 165), who argues with respect to training programs that ‘these programs cost 
only a few thousand dollars or less per participant. To expect such programs to raise 
participants’ subsequent annual earnings by several thousand dollars would imply that 
these social investments have an extraordinary rate of return.’ 
The ‘threat’ effect of new programs 
Many labour market programs are activated at a specific duration in a payment 
recipient’s unemployment spell. For example, the initial implementation of MOI 
required an unemployment payment recipient to participate in an approved MOI 
activity once their unemployment spell duration reached six months. Where an 
activation date for participation in a program is specified, the possibility exists that a 
payment recipient might exit payments prior to (or around) that date, in order to avoid 
participating in the program. This is known as a threat effect. Where threat effects have 
been looked for, they have almost universally been found to exist. 
In Australia several studies found evidence of a threat effect associated with the 
MOI (see Richardson 2002; Lim 2008; Borland and Tseng 2010). Richardson (2002) 
examined the rate of exit from payments after the introduction of MOI in 1997 to 1998 
and found a significant increase in the rate of exit from payments (about 8–10 percent) 
just before the six month period ended. Lim (2008) undertook a similar analysis for 
unemployment payment recipients aged 46–49 years. She found that the requirement 
to participate in MOI increased the rate of exit from unemployment payments by 3.1 
percent, and increased the rate of exit from all payments by 1.6 percent. 
International studies of threat effects encompass programs implemented in the US 
(Black et al. 2003); UK (Dolton and O’Neill 1996; Blundell et al. 2004); Sweden 
(Carling and Larson 2005); and Denmark (Geerdsen 2006). All these studies found 
evidence for threat effects – often quite large in size. For example, Black et al.’s 
(2003) analysis of the Worker Profiling and Re-employment Services System found 
that the impact of being referred to that program is to reduce average weeks of UI 
benefit by about 2.2 weeks, most of which is due to a threat effect. Comparing between 
these international studies establishes that threat effects are weaker where financial 
penalties associated with program non-participation are larger, and where job search 
assistance is provided prior to program participation. 
The existence of lock-in effects 
Outcomes for participants in labour market program are often observed to be worse 
than for a control group during their period of participation, but once participation in 
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the program is complete this reverses, with better outcomes for the participants than 
control group. The initial phase of this pattern has become known as a ‘lock-in effect’. 
While undertaking a labour market program, participants make the program their main 
activity and hence are likely to do less job search. It follows that they have a lower 
probability of moving off payments or into employment during this period. Once 
participants complete the program, they are able to resume job search, potentially with 
a higher level of skills or job readiness, and at this time they should have a higher 
probability of moving off payments or into employment than the control group. 
However, where the program participants have not gained extra skills, or the extra 
period of unemployment due to program participation has created negative long-run 
effects on the probability of obtaining employment (for example, due to employers 
using unemployment duration to rank job applicants or attaching a stigma to program 
participants), the reversal may not occur. In this situation, the phase of lock-in causes a 
permanently lower job finding probability for program participants. 
Borland and Tseng (2010; 2011) found evidence of lock-in effects for both WfD 
and the MOI. During the six months of participation in WfD, more participants moved 
off unemployment income support than the matched control group of non-participants, 
with only weak reversal in that pattern once participation was completed. Participation 
in MOI also caused lower rates of exit from payments than the matched control group 
during the first 2–5 months after commencement. In this case, however, there was a 
stronger subsequent reversal, with little difference in outcomes between participants 
and non-participants by 12 months after MOI activity commencement. Lock-in effects 
have also been commonly observed in international studies of labour market programs 
(for example, van Ours 2002; Wunsch and Lechner 2008).  
Lessons for policy-makers 
We can draw together ten lessons from the preceding evidence review to guide policy-
makers. 
1. Active labour market programs cannot by themselves have a major impact on the 
rate of unemployment. This is because the rate of unemployment depends 
primarily on the rate of employment growth, and labour market programs do not 
significantly affect the total number of jobs that are available in the economy.  
2. The extent of reliance (and spending) on active labour market programs should be 
tailored to the net benefit they provide to society. The main policy response to 
high unemployment should continue to be to achieve higher rates of economic 
growth. At the same time, some spending on active labour market programs 
appears justified by the benefits they can provide - for example, where the 
programs are able to increase the number of unemployed who are ‘job ready’ for 
when extra jobs become available, or improve the speed of matching between the 
unemployed and job vacancies. 
3. You get what you pay for. Outcomes for the unemployed from active labour 
market programs are related to the scale of intervention. For job-seekers with high 
levels of disadvantage, programs that work are likely to be relatively expensive. 
However in doing the benefit-cost calculation on those programs it is important to 
remember that the payoff may be to create a productive worker for the next 45 
years.  
4. Counselling for job seekers has small effects. This is especially the case for 
programs that involve a limited scale of intervention and are targeted at highly 
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disadvantaged groups such as long-term unemployed. There is mixed evidence on 
the relative effectiveness of provision of job counselling by public sector agencies 
compared to private sector suppliers. Where the counsellors’ role is to assign 
unemployed to labour market programs, some evidence suggests that it is better to 
make assignment dependent on a statistical rule rather than allowing discretion to 
case managers. 
5. Job search verification programs can have quite large effects in shifting job-
seeker participants off income support. These programs seem to work mainly by 
increasing participants’ job search activity, and hence their impact on labour 
market outcomes for job seekers varies with demand in local labour markets. A 
major caveat is that improved outcomes for participants in job search verification 
programs appear to be mainly at the expense of job-seekers who do not participate 
in the job search programs.  
6. Administration matters. Participation in active labour market programs – even for 
programs deemed compulsory – will depend to a significant extent on how the 
program is implemented by case managers. 
7. Private sector job creation programs, such as wage subsidies, are effective in 
improving employment outcomes for job-seekers. Private sector programs appear 
to work by giving job seekers the opportunity to demonstrate to employers that 
they have the skills to undertake the job to which they are assigned. However, a 
shortcoming of these programs is that employers may only be willing to take on 
participants they regard as relatively ‘job ready’.  
8. Public sector job creation programs generally have a zero or negative effect on 
outcomes for job-seekers. The major weaknesses of these programs are the lack of 
skill development and the absence of a pathway to a permanent job.  
9. Evidence on formal education and training programs is mixed. The most positive 
effects of these programs are found for women, the weakest for youth. There is 
some evidence that training programs have larger long-run than short-run effects. 
10. Threat effects and lock-in effects are important. A threat effect can occur where 
job seekers exit welfare payments in order to avoid the requirement to participate 
in an active labour market program. The experience of program participation can 
also be associated with a lock-in effect where outcomes for participants are made 
worse during their period in the program.  
Together these lessons suggest the following model for policy-making. Existing 
models of job search counselling and assistance and wage subsidy programs are good 
ways to assist the unemployed who are job ready and less disadvantaged. To assist the 
unemployed with higher levels of disadvantage, priority should be given to programs 
that create jobs with opportunities for linked training, and where those jobs provide a 
pathway to permanent job. Implementing this approach is likely to be best done at a 
decentralised level via relationships between a) businesses that are willing to provide 
opportunities for the unemployed and b) the not-for-profit/service providers who can 
do the work of giving the unemployed the basic capabilities employers require to take 
them on. It follows that government funding of services for the unemployed needs to 
facilitate decentralised and local solutions. These are likely to involve tailored 
intervention and may be relatively expensive.  
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 Appendix 1: Summary table of studies reviewed 
Study Program Target population Method Outcome measures and findings 
Borland, Tseng 
and Wilkins 
(2013) 
YP4 (2005-09): Assignment of a 
case manager for 18-30 months 
with the objective to provide 
integrated service delivery targeted 
at the client’s needs. 
Aged 18 to 35 years, in receipt of 
Newstart Allowance or Youth 
Allowance (other), homeless or 
with a history of homelessness, and 
‘disadvantaged’, as evidenced by 
eligibility for the Personal Support 
Program (PSP), Job Placement, 
Employment and Training (JPET) 
program or Intensive Support-
Customised Assistance (ISCA).  
RCT (Plus PS matching due to 
evidence that randomisation was not 
achieved) (Control group do not 
receive case management) 
Outcomes: Receipt of income support; 
Employment outcomes; Health and well-
being; Community engagement. 
Findings: No significant effect of 
participation in YP4 on economic or 
psychological well-being. 
Borland and 
Tseng (2011) 
Work for the Dole (pilot phase: 
1997-98): Community-based work 
experience program. Participation 
in WfD was required for a 
maximum of six months, and 
involved working for six hours per 
day for two days if aged 18 to 20 
years, and working for six hours 
per day for two and a half days if 
aged 21 to 24 years.  
Recipients of Newstart Allowance 
aged 18 to 24 years on full rate of 
income support who had been in 
receipt of income support for at 
least six months.  
Exact matching: Treatment group is 
payment recipients who commence 
WfD in sample period. Control 
group is matched payment recipients 
who never commence WfD in 
sample period. CIA justified by 
argument that funding limits in pilot 
phase of WfD introduced geographic 
randomness into assignment to WfD 
in 1997. 
Outcomes: Likelihood of moving off 
welfare payment; Total time spent on 
welfare payments. 
Findings: Participation in WfD causes a 
large significant adverse effect on the 
likelihood of exiting unemployment 
payments. For example, participants spend 
on average 2.2 fortnights longer on 
payments during first 12 months after 
commencement of participation in WfD. 
Borland and 
Tseng (2010) 
Mutual Obligation Initiative 
(1997-99): Requirement to 
participate in an approved activity 
(eg., part-time work; voluntary 
work; intensive job search) 
Newstart Allowance or Youth 
Allowance (other) aged 18-24 who 
have received payments for a 
continuous period of 6 months. 
(a)Threat effect: Difference-in-
difference matching – Compare 
outcome change in outcome from 
before and after MOI for group aged 
18 to 24 years who were required to 
undertake MOI activity and control 
group aged 25 to 31 years who were 
not required to participate. 
(b) Participation effect: PS 
Matching:  
Treatment group is payment 
recipients required to participate in 
MOI who commence MOI at each of 
13
th
 to 22
nd
 fortnights of payment 
spell. Control group is matched 
Outcoms: Whether exit from income 
support payments. 
Findings: (a) Threat effect – On 
introduction of MOI there is significant 
increase in rate of exit from payments for 
group of income support recipients 
required to participate in MOI compared 
to control group. However, that effect 
decreases significantly for payment 
recipients whose spells on payments 
commence at later dates. (b) Participation 
effect: Strong evidence of lock-in effects. 
At six months after commencement of 
MOI activity the participant group have a 
probability of exiting payments that is 
 Study Program Target population Method Outcome measures and findings 
payment recipients who are required 
to participate in MOI but who had 
not commenced in MOI by that 
specified fortnight. 
lower than the control group by 6 
percentage points. 
Commonwealth 
DEEWR (2010a) 
Multiple programs associated with 
activity test requirements for 
receipt of Newstart and Youth 
allowances – for example, Mutual 
Obligation; Work for the Dole; Job 
Placement, Employment and 
training (2007-08) 
Newstart and Youth allowance 
recipients eligible to undertake 
each type of program who 
commenced in the respective 
program in February 2007. 
Regression modelling:(1)Estimate 
relation between observable 
characteristics and outcome variable 
for control group; (2) Use results 
from stage (1) to predict outcomes 
for program participants; (3) 
Compare predicted outcomes from 
stage (2) with actual outcomes for 
participant group. 
Outcome: Whether off income support 
payments at 12 months after program 
commencement (March 2008). 
Findings: Participation in programs 
generally found to reduce likelihood of 
being on payments. For example, 
participation in WfD lowers incidence of 
receipt of payments by 10.3 percentage 
points; and participation in MOI lowers 
incidence of receipt of payments by 6.9. 
Only negative effects for Personal Support 
Programme and Job Placement, 
Employment and Training Programme. 
Commonwealth 
DEEWR (2010b) 
Indigenous Employment 
Program (2005-07): Structured 
Training and Employment Projects 
(STEP): Financial assistance for 
projects that provide structured 
training and can lead to a 
permanent job; Wage assistance: 
Payment of wage subsidy for up to 
26 weeks to employer who gives a 
job to an eligible Indigenous 
jobseeker. 
STEP: Indigenous Australian; 
Wage assistance: Indigenous 
jobseekers registered with 
Centrelink and on an eligible 
income support payment; or under 
21 and not on income support; or 
participant in CDEP or disability 
support services. 
Regression modelling: (1)Estimate 
relation between observable 
characteristics and outcome variable 
for control group; (2) Use results 
from stage (1) to predict outcomes 
for program participants; (3) 
Compare predicted outcomes from 
stage (2) with actual outcomes for 
participant group. 
Outcome: Whether have moved off 
income support payments. 
Findings: Participation in STEP increases 
proportion of payment recipients who 
have moved off payments by 12.5 
percentage points at 12 months after 
program commencement. Participation in 
wage assistance scheme increases 
proportion of payment recipients who 
have moved off payments by 12.2 
percentage points at 12 months after 
program commencement. Size of impact 
decreases with time since commencement 
in the program. 
 Study Program Target population Method Outcome measures and findings 
Lim (2008) Mutual Obligation Initiative 
(2002-04): Requirement to 
participate in an approved activity 
(eg., part-time work; voluntary 
work; intensive job search) 
Newstart Allowance or Youth 
Allowance (other) aged 46-49 who 
have received payments for a 
continuous period of 6 months. 
Difference in difference: Compare 
change in outcomes for payment 
recipients aged 46 to 49 years 
(required to undertake MOI after 1 
July 2002) from before and after 
introduction of MOI with change in 
payment outcomes for payment 
recipients aged 50 to 53 years (not 
required to participate in MOI). 
Outcome: Whether exit from 
unemployment payments. 
Findings: Requirement to participate in 
MOI increases the rate of exit from 
Newstart Allowance in fortnights 12 to 15 
of payment spell by 3.1 percentage points; 
and increases the rate of exit from all 
payments by 1.6 percentage points (from 
just prior to just after the commencement 
of participation in MOI). 
Johnson (2007)  Working Nation (1994-97): 
Job Compact provides case 
management and a guarantee of a 
job placement for 6 months 
(subsidised placement or public 
sector job creation). 
Unemployment payment recipients 
aged 15 to 59 years with spells of 
18 months or more and recipients 
assessed as being at risk of long-
term unemployment. 
PS Matching: Three treatment 
groups who are assigned to 
participate in training, wage subsidy 
program, or public sector job 
creation. Control group does not 
participate in any of those programs. 
CIA justified by argument that 
assignment is on basis of 
observables – length of 
unemployment spell or JSC index. 
Outcomes: Probability of employment and 
unemployment 24 months after 
commencement in program. 
Findings: Participation in wage subsidy 
program increases probability of 
employment by 21 percentage points and 
reduces probability of unemployment by 
10 percentage points relative to non-
participation. No significant effect of 
public sector job creation or training 
compared to non-participation. 
Borland and 
Tseng (2007) 
Job Seeker Diary (1997-98): 
Requirement to provide details of 
specified number of job 
applications each fortnight over 
initial 3 months of unemployment 
payment spell. 
Newstart payment recipients 
commencing payment spells who 
are subject to the activity test and 
whose activity type is job search 
aged 18-49 years 
PS Matching:  
Treatment group is payment 
recipients who commence JSD in 1
st
 
fortnight of spell. Control group is 
matched payment recipients who do 
not commence JSD in 1
st
 fortnight of 
spell. CIA justified by argument that 
industrial relations dispute 
introduced geographic randomness 
into assignment to JSD in 1996. 
Outcomes: Likelihood of moving off 
welfare payment; Total time spent on 
welfare payments. 
Findings: Participation in JSD 
significantly increases the likelihood of 
exiting payments, and reduces total time 
spent on payments. For example, 
participating immediately in JSD reduces 
time spent on payments by 0.9 fortnight in 
the first 12 months after commencing the 
JSD. About half of JSD participants 
estimated to have reduced time on 
payments. Largest effects of JSD occur for 
payment recipients for whom labour 
demand conditions are the most 
‘favourable’. Cost-benefit analysis 
suggests a fairly large social gain for 
program participants. 
 Study Program Target population Method Outcome measures and findings 
Commonwealth 
DEWR (2006) 
Job Search Training, Intensive 
Assistance and Work for the 
Dole 
(2004-05) 
Newstart and Youth allowance 
recipients eligible to undertake 
each type of program who 
commenced in the respective 
program in February 2004. 
Regression modelling: (1)Estimate 
relation between observable 
characteristics and outcome variable 
for control group; (2) Use results 
from stage (1) to predict outcomes 
for program participants; (3) 
Compare predicted outcomes from 
stage (2) with actual outcomes for 
participant group. 
Outcome: Whether in employment at 12 
months after program commencement 
(February 2005). 
Findings: Increase in incidence of 
employment for Job Search Training, 
Work for the Dole and MOI of 11.2, 7.3 
and 8.2 percentage points respectively. 
Breunig, Cobb-
Clark, Dunlop 
and Terrill 
(2003) 
Assisting the long-term 
unemployed (2000-01): 
Requirement to attend two face-to-
face interviews with a Centrelink 
case manager. 
Individuals receiving Newstart 
allowance for 5 years or more. 
RCT (Plus PS matching due to 
evidence that randomisation was not 
achieved) (Control group do not 
receive case management) 
Outcomes: Economic participation (for 
example, average weekly hours working, 
looking for work, and studying/training); 
Social participation (for example, 
proportion engaged in voluntary work). 
Findings: Only effect on social 
participation – Rate of participation in 
social activity with friends or club 
membership is higher by 7.5 percent. 
Richardson 
(2003, chapter 4) 
Mutual Obligation Initiative 
(1997-98): Requirement to 
participate in an approved activity 
(eg., part-time work; voluntary 
work; intensive job search) 
Newstart Allowance or Youth 
Allowance (other) aged 18-24 who 
have received payments for a 
continuous period of 6 months. 
Regression: Compare outcomes 
between groups in eligible 
population who participate in each 
different approved MOI activity with 
outcomes for payment recipients in 
eligible population who do not 
participate in MOI. 
Outcome: Whether exit from 
unemployment payments. 
Findings: Higher rate of exit when MOI 
activity is part-time work, intensive job 
search, education/training or voluntary 
work than when MOI activity is WfD or 
MOI plus funded assistance 
 Study Program Target population Method Outcome measures and findings 
Richardson 
(2002) 
Mutual Obligation Initiative 
(1997-98): Requirement to 
participate in an approved activity 
(eg., part-time work; voluntary 
work; intensive job search) 
Newstart Allowance or Youth 
Allowance (other) aged 18-24 who 
have received payments for a 
continuous period of 6 months. 
Difference in difference: Compare 
change in outcomes for payment 
recipients aged 23-24 years (required 
to undertake MOI) from before and 
after introduction of MOI with 
change in payment outcomes for 
payment recipients aged 25-26 years 
(not required to participate in MOI). 
Outcome: Whether exit from 
unemployment payments. 
Findings: Requirement to participate in 
MOI increases the rate of exit from 
payments in fortnights 12 to 15 of 
payment spell from about 8 per cent to 10 
per cent (from just prior to just after the 
commencement of when participation in 
MOI occurs). 
Barrett and 
Cobb-Clark 
(2000-01) 
Parenting Payment Intervention 
Pilot (1999): Parenting payment 
recipients either asked to 
voluntarily have an interview with 
a JET adviser or compelled to have 
that interview. 
Specified groups of Parenting 
Payment recipients – for example, 
those in receipt of PP for more 
than 5 years. 
RCT (Control group are PP 
recipients from same specified 
groups of PP recipients who are not 
asked or compelled to attend 
interview) 
Outcomes: Interview take-up rates; Effect 
of interview on plans for training. 
Findings: Significant effect of intervention 
on interview attendance (81% compulsory 
group; 17% voluntary group). Effect of 
interview on plans similar between 
compulsory and voluntary groups. 
Stromback and 
Dockery (2000) 
Working Nation (1994-97): 
Job Compact provides case 
management and a guarantee of a 
job placement for 6 months 
(subsidised placement or public 
sector job creation). 
Unemployment payment recipients 
aged 15 to 59 years with spells of 
18 months or more and recipients 
assessed as being at risk of long-
term unemployment. 
Regression: Compare outcomes 
between groups who participate in 
each different Job Compact activity 
with outcomes for payment 
recipients in who do not participate 
in a labour market program. 
Outcome: Whether exit from 
unemployment payments.  
Findings: Participation in a Job Compact 
program associated with t a higher rate of 
exit from payments. Larger effects for 
wage subsidy and direct job creation 
programs, and smaller effects for training 
and job search assistance. 
Commonwealth 
DEWRSB 
(2000) 
Work for the Dole (1999): 
Requirement to contribute to a 
specified project of benefit to the 
community. 
Recipients of Newstart Allowance 
(NSA) aged 18 to 24 years on full 
rate of income support who had 
been in receipt of income support 
for at least six months.  
Matching:Treatment group is job 
seekers who left a WfD project in 
August 1999. Control group is job 
seekers who had not participated in 
or been referred to WfD in the six 
months prior to August 1999. 
Matching done using age, gender 
and duration on benefits. 
Outcome: Whether had left income 
support payments. 
Findings: 30 percent of WfD participants 
had left payments six months after August 
1999 compared to 17 percent for control 
group. 
 Study Program Target population Method Outcome measures and findings 
Richardson 
(1998) 
Special Youth Employment 
Training Program (1984-87): 
Wage subsidy paid for 17 weeks to 
employers willing to give a job to 
an eligible unemployed person 
Unemployment payment recipients 
aged 15-24 years who had been 
unemployed and not in full-time 
education for at least four of the 
last twelve months. 
Instrumental variables: First-stage 
model for participation in SYETP. 
Second-stage model for subsequent 
employment outcomes including 
whether participated in SYETP as an 
explanatory variable. 
Outcome: Probability of employment. 
Findings: Participants in SYETP are 26 
percent more likely to be in employment 
at 8 to 13 months after participation in 
SYETP, and 20 percent between 14 to 26 
months after participation. Effect is mainly 
due to participants retaining their initial 
job beyond the subsidy period. 
 
